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PUBLIC UTILITIES AND STATE ACTION:
THE BEGINNING OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS
By ROGER S. HAYD0CK*

Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co. represents the first case
in which a federal court of appeals found sufficient state action
to hold a privately owned public utility to constitutional restraints. Specifically, the court found that in threatening to
terminate utility services to subscribers,a privately owned public
utility acted within "color of state law" for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
section 1983. Mr. Haydock, the attorney of record who successfully argued the Ihrke position in this decision, advances in the
following article a number of arguments which are designed to
demonstrate that all privately owned public utility companies
should be held subject to the principles of state action.
It is our job to see to it that you are given a chance to
live. If utilities will help, it is our job- our duty- to

provide them.
We believe a public utility has great public obligations.
We want to build brighter lives for all of us.
-A

Public Utility Advertisement

TILITY subscribers have attempted to hold utility companies to their stated obligations and responsibilities.' Consumers in many states have questioned the propriety of rate
U

increases sought by utility companies. 2 Subscribers in other
states have appeared before numerous governmental public utility commissions calling for the revision of rules regulating utilities. National welfare rights organizations have organized local
opposition to utility operations which discriminate against the
*

Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul,

Minnesota; formerly Chief Counsel with Legal Assistance of Ramsey
County, St. Paul, Minnesota; A.B., St. Mary's College (Minnesota),
1967; J.D., DePaul University College of Law, 1969; Reginald Heber
Smith Community Lawyer Fellow, University of Pennsylvania, 1970.
1 Senator Lee Metcalf and Vic Reinemer in their book OVERCHARGE (1967)
describe in detail the practices of public utilities and offer a blistering
attack on the failure of utility companies to live up to their public
obligations.
2 See In re Tuscon Gas & Elec. Co., 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 769 (Apr. 1972);
In re Public Serv. Co., 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 206 (Dec. 1969); Consumers Educ. & Protective Ass'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 206

(Dec. 1969).
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poor. 3 Environmental groups have demanded that utility companies preserve and protect natural resources which are now
being so heavily exploited.
Amidst all these challenges, the utility companies have
emerged relatively unscathed and continue to operate in the
ways of the past.4 While consumers have petitioned courts and
administrative agencies for redress of grievances allegedly caused
by utilities, such forums have been slow to respond. However,
recently within 3 months of one another, two federal circuit
courts and three federal district courts ruled on the question
of whether certain collection practices of privately owned utility companies constituted state action. Three courts held in
the affirmative; two held in the negative.
State action, the constitutional issue before these courts,
concerns the safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States which prohibit the deprivation of individual rights by those who act under governmental authority,
sanction, or direction. 5 To recover in such an action, the complaining party must show that (1) the actions of the party
complained of constitute governmental or state action and that
(2) such actions violate certain of an individual's rights, privileges, or immunities as defined by the Constitution. The successful application of this formula, as accomplished in three of
the above decisions, greatly enhances the consumer's ability to
challenge the operations and activities of privately owned public
service companies in a judicial forum. To that end this article
specifically focuses on the first of the two elements of the constitutional equation by demonstrating that the actions of privately owned public utility companies constitute governmental
or state action. This focus establishes a basis for suits asserting
that constitutional rights- such as due process and equal protection - should be applied to restrain utility companies.
In demonstrating that the actions of privately owned utilities constitute state action, the first part of this article will briefly analyze the five recent decisions mentioned above. Part II
will then present five separate areas of analysis, each of which
3 See, e.g., Carbondale W.R.O. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 5

CLEAR-

REv. 333 (Oct. 1971).
4 While this article will later argue that the government has subjected
utility corporations to heavy regulation, such regulatory commissions
have not included representatives of consumer groups, minority organizations, or environmental groups. Often such regulation has served and
advanced the needs of the utility companies themselves, largely ignoring the public trust.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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is sufficient in itself to demonstrate that privately owned public
utilities are subject to state action concepts.
A.

I.
The Ihrke Decision

RECENT DECISIONS

In Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 6 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that this privately owned public utility,
in threatening to terminate gas and electric services to a subscriber, acted within color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
section 1983. Northern States Power (Northern) threatened to
terminate utility services to the Ihrkes for failure to pay a past
bill and a utility security deposit. The Ihrkes disputed paying
this bill and deposit and, on behalf of a class of subscribers,
sought judicial relief by way of a declaratory judgment and
an injuction, alleging that the collection practices of Northern
violated their due process rights. The Ihrkes alleged that Northern routinely terminated gas and electric services without
affording subscribers timely notice and an opportunity to be
heard in opposition to such termination.
After granting the Ihrkes an initial temporary restraining
order, the federal district court found that Northern had no
constitutional obligation because the utility company was simply
a private corporation going about the business of selling utility
services. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding it "abundantly
clear" that Northern's activities constituted state action. After
reviewing the extensive regulatory scheme within which the
utility operated, the Eighth Circuit found Northern to be so
entwined with governmental control as to render the public
utility a state actor:
Federal courts have generally recognized private conduct as
"color of law" or "state action" when it performs a "public"
7
function and is subjected to "public" regulation.

B. The Palmer Decision
The day before the Eighth Circuit decided Ihrke, the federal
district court in Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co.8 held similarly
that the privately owned public utility acted under color of law
in terminating services to utility subscribers without notice or
hearing. Ohio regulated this and other similar utilities by a
myriad of state statutes and through the jurisdiction of the
Ohio Public Utilities Commission. After noting the monopolistic
6 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 41 U.S.L.W. 3182 (Oct. 10,
1972).
7 Id. at 569.
8 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
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status of the Columbia Gas Company and the specific statutes
authorizing the utility to terminate gas service for alleged nonpayment of a bill, the court held:
Clearly these statutes, particularly the latter one, show that
the governmental relations with the defendant are far different and far greater than the mere provisions for enfranchisement of ordinary business enterprises. The state's thumb
is indeed heavy upon the scales ....
When the defendant's collectors enter upon private property
to carry out the procedures necessary to shut off a customer's
gas, they are acting in a governmental capacity, and exercising the police power of the state .... 9
The Stanford Decision
Following the lead of the Ihrke and Palmer courts, the
federal district court in Stanford v. Gas Service Co., 10 held a
privately owned public utility to be existing and operating
under color of state law. The court relied on several factors
for its conclusion: the "extreme regulation" by the State of
Kansas over the gas company's right to and method of business,
the "complete monopoly" enjoyed by the company in furnishing
an "essential commodity," and the "public function" performed
by the company in the "public interest." These activities, the
court concluded, lost any "private character" and consequently
subjected this utility to constitutional restraints."
C.

The Jackson Decision
In a departure from the three previous decisions, the district court in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. held that a
privately owned public utility did not act under color of law
in terminating utility services to a subscriber.' 2 The court
adopted the utility company's argument that in order for state
action to exist the state must be involved not simply with the
institution whose activity is alleged to have inflicted the injury,
but that the state must be involved with the activity that
caused the injury. This state action concept has not been arD.

' Id. at 245-46.

10 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972).
11 Id. at 722.
12

348 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1972).

The court did not consider the

state's indirect involvement with the utility's collection practices, which
could affect the state action question. See United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 750 (1965). States, including Pennsylvania, do not require

utility companies to file tariffs for frivolous reasons, but rather to overview the operation of the companies and regulate activities taken under
those tariffs. Upon accepting such tariffs, a state deems the tariff
to be reasonable and places a governmental imprimatur on such rules.
A state does not accept responsibily for the filing of unreasonable tariffs,
but would require the utility to modify such tariffs and make them reasonable. The court in Jackson did not consider these involvements of

the State of Pennsylvania.
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ticulated in any previous Supreme Court decision, and its narrow application stands in conflict with many Supreme Court
decisions expanding state action. The predominant thrust of
the decisions will be discussed in the second part of this article.
E. The Lucas Decision
In a case with a result similar to that in Jackson, the Seventh Circuit in Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. 1 3 held that
this privately owned public utility did not operate under color of
law in threatening to terminate services to the plaintiff subscriber. The Seventh Circuit in several previous decisions involving similar activities of public utilities found state action
absent. Not surprisingly perhaps, the court reaffirmed those
decisions. 4
However, that portion of the Lucas opinion which concerned
itself with state action failed to present a complete, convincing
argument and disregarded the similarities in the above three
cases which supported a finding of state action. Specifically, the
decision largely ignored the facts of the case, disregarded the
history of public utilities, failed to consider their public function
and service to the public interest, and summarily dismissed their
monopolistic status. 15 Because state action decisions turn primarily on such facts as the above, 1 the court's failure to deal with
these vital circumstances casts suspicion on the validity of
17
this decision.
In its footnotes, used primarily to distinguish other state
action cases, the court concerned itself with the recent decision
of Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.1 The court improperly relied
on this decision to support its holding. Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion in Moose Lodge found no state action be13 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972).
14 In Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 846 (1969), the Seventh Circuit found no state action in the
conduct of a privately owned public utility where that company terminated commercial telephone service to a subscriber. The court found
that the telephone company had only filed its own regulations with the
state and that the state did not benefit from, encourage, request, or
cooperate in the suspension of service. Subsequently, in Particular
Cleaners, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 457 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1972),
the court again found the state not sufficiently involved in the utility
company's practice of charging security deposits to convert such conduct into state action. Though a regulation issued by the Illinois Commerce Commission specifically permitted the company to charge a
security deposit, the court held that the regulation did not enlarge the
company's right in the absence of statute or regulation to charge deposits, but rather limited such deposits to reasonable amounts.

15 466 F.2d at 641-44.

16 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), quoted
in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).

17 See 466 F.2d at 641-44.
1s 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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cause: (1) the private club was not open to the public, (2)
the club did not serve a public function, (3) the lodge did not
have a monopoly on liquor licenses, and (4) the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board did not establish or enforce the discriminatory club policies. In Lucas, on the other hand, each and every
one of these criteria were fulfilled: the privately owned public
utility (1) served the public, (2) performed a public or governmental function, (3) had a monopoly and (4) was subject
to governmental regulations to establish and enforce its policies.
Moose Lodge sets down criteria defining lack of state action.
At the other end of the spectrum, direct action by the government constitutes the most obvious example of state action.
Privately owned public utilities do not resemble the state action
concepts espoused in Moose Lodge but rather closely resemble
the function, interests, and authority of a governmental unit.1 9
F.

The Lucas Dissent

The dissenting opinion in Lucas analyzed the facts and applied the principles of state action as found in the Ihrke, Palmer,
and Stanford decisions. 20 Judge Sprecher in his dissent began
with the historical common law distinction between a private
business and a public utility concluding that, at the time of
the enactment of the fourteenth amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, "pervasive regulation by the state was limited
to the natural monopolies, public utilities which enjoyed extensive public privileges and to which citizens were compelled to
19 In fact, with regard to public utility cases, Moose Lodge stands as prece-

dent for declaring such privately owned utilities subject to constitutional requirements due to inherent state action. The Court in Moose
Lodge did find color of law in the club's compliance with a state regulation reading: "Every club licensee shall adhere to all of the provisions
of its Constitution and By-laws." Id. at 181. The private club in discriminating against blacks followed its by-laws. The Court concluded
that action taken under such by-laws, action which was in turn sanctioned by the state through this requirement, constituted state action.
The above liquor regulation closely resembles state regulations
promulgated by public utility commissions or enacted by state legislatures requiring utility companies to adhere to their practices as set out
in their filed tariffs. These tariffs, for instance, detailing such things as
collections operations, resemble the by-laws of the Moose Lodge and,
accordingly, the enforcement of such tariffs by the public utility constitutes state action under the holding in Moose Lodge.
20 State action within the scope of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution bears the identical meaning with "color of state law"
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970). United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1965). The Court therein cited as support: Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944); Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 336 F.2d 630 (6th
Cir. 1964); Simpkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959
(4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Hampton v. City of
Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962);
Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960); Kerr
v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 721 (1945).
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resort. 2 1 Judge Sprecher then listed in detail the extensive governmental, statutory, administrative, and municipal supervision
of Wisconsin Electric and concluded that the company enjoyed
a "state-bestowed, state-protected and state-regulated natural
monopoly ....
'"22 These factors, added to the performance by
the company of a "public function," rendered the company a
"thoroughly state-integrated government-substitute .... ,,23
II.

THE

PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC UTILITY AS STATE ACTOR

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
the principle that each state action case must be considered on
its own facts and circumstances. The Court has stated:
Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attrib24
uted its true significance.

In conformity with this general test, the remainder of this
article individually analyzes five separate areas pertaining to
utilities and demonstrates that any one of these areas sufficiently subjects privately owned public utilities to state action
limitations. These areas include:
A. action under governmental authority,
B. action subject to governmental regulation,
C. performance of a governmental function,
D. direct financial benefit to the government, and
E.

monopolistic status.

25

21 466 F.2d at 661.
22 466 F.2d at 663. The court voted 6-2 to affirm the district court judgment in favor of the utility company. C.J. Swygert joined in the dissent
with J. Sprecher.
23 466 F.2d at 665.
24
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), quoted
in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
25 Judge Kerner, in a concurring opinion in Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 407 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1969), suggested seven characteristics peculiar to a public utility that may be indicative of state
action:
[I]t may be possible to demonstrate that a privatelyowned publicly-regulated utility or carrier or similar entity
has a sufficient nexus with or dependence on a state as to make
some of its actions under color of law. Some of the factors
which should be considered are whether 1) the entity is subject to close regulation by a statutorily-created body (such as
the Illinois Commerce Commission), 2) the regulations filed
with the regulatory body are required to be filed as a condition of the entity's operation, 3) the regulations must be approved by the regulatory body to be effective, 4) the entity is
given a total or partial monopoly by the regulatory body,
5) the regulatory body controls the rates charged and/or specific services offered by the entity, 6) the actions of the entity
are subject to review by the regulatory body, and 7) the regulation permits the entity to perform acts which it may not otherwise perform without violating state law. There may be
other factors to be considered besides those here enumerated.
The enumeration here of particular factors means that less than
all may be sufficient to show color of law in some cases and
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Governmental Authority

The Supreme Court has held that state action occurs where
private individuals take action under the authority given them
26
by the state. In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co.
the Court held that a labor organization operating under the
authority of a federal statute as an exclusive bargaining representative acted as a state actor in representing employees of a
particular craft. In a subsequent union case, American Communications Association v. Douds, the Court reaffirmed the
"authority" doctrine:
But power is never without responsibility. And when authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales,
the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely
akin, in some respects, to its exercise by the Government
27

itself.

Further, in Nixon v. Condon,28 the Court declared that private
individuals clothed by statute with power ordinarily reserved
for the state (the determination of qualification for voters)
acted as "representatives of the state to such an extent and in
such a sense that the great restraints of the Constitution set
29
limits to this action.
Actions taken by municipalities and other political subdivisions, including the enactment of ordinances or promulgation of orders or regulations, constitute state action. 30 In Boman
that nothing less than all may be required in other cases.
Each case will depend on its facts.
The Eighth Circuit in Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d
566, 569 (8th Cir. 1972), considered the above formula and found state
action after measuring the extent of governmental involvement in the
following seven areas. (1) the City of St. Paul's granting to Northern an exclusive franchise to furnish gas and electric utility services;
(2) the City's permission allowing Northern to use all public property
to provide such necessary services; (3) the payment by Northern to
the City of 5% of Northern's St. Paul gross earnings in consideration;
(4) the City Council's right to review, revise, or reject the operating
procedures, rate changes, schedules, contracts, agreements, rules, and
regulations of Northern; (5) the City Council's explicit right to review,
revise, or reject the collection and termination policies of Northern; (6)
Northern's required filing with the City of schedules, contracts, agreements, rules, regulations, and financial statements; and (7) the dependence of Northern upon the City for prior approval of many of its
operations in the City.
26 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
27339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950).

28286 U.S. 73 (1932).
In a subsequent voter discrimination case, Smith v. All29Id. at 89.
wright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), the Court also found requisite governmental authority constituting state action where a political primary
operating pursuant to a state statutory system directed the selection
of party officers and the election procedures.
30 Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 479-80 (1968) ; Robinson v. Florida,
378 U.S. 153, 156-57 (1965).
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v. Birmingham Transit Co., 31 an ordinance of the City of Birmingham permitted the privately owned public transit company
to issue regulations for bus seating. The plaintiffs sought an
injunction against the enforcement of the transit company's
regulation ordering segregated seating. The court found that
the transit company's action taken pursuant to the city's ordinance constituted state action. In Kissinger v. New York
Transit Authority,32 a private advertising company operating
under authority derived from the municipally owned transit
authority which, in turn, was created and regulated under a
state statute, refused to accept an anti-war advertisement. The
court traced the line of governmental authority and found color
of law in such refusal.
In the Palmer case, the State of Ohio enacted statutes which
authorized utility companies to terminate services to subscribers
for nonpayment of bills and specified the manner and time of
such terminations. The court quoted the language from American
Communications Association v. Douds, adding:
For whatever the reason, the Ohio Legislature in its infinite
wisdom decided to bestow upon the gas company a right to
terminate the furnishing of gas to those customers who refused
to make payment. Action brought pursuant to that statute
33
is action under color of state law.

These cases, which have found state action because of the
governmental authority granted, are directly analogous to utility companies which find themselves subject to a myriad of
34
statutes and rules directed toward regulating their operations.
Specifically, in the United States the right to engage in the
public utility business, unlike most other business, exists only
with the permission of public authority. Such public authority
may be conveyed, depending upon the state, by (1) charter,
(2) license (permit), (3) certificates of convenience and necessity, or (4) franchise. Utility companies in most states must not
only obtain a charter of incorporation to do business in the state
(or a corporate authorization to do business) but must also
obtain a charter as a public service corporation. This latter
charter subjects the utility company to various restrictions and
imposes duties different from those of an ordinary business corporation. In addition, various state agencies of a particular state
31280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
32 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
33 342 F. Supp. 241, 245 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
34 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 49 (Page 1954), as amended, (Supp.
1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 196 (West 1957), as amended, (Supp. 1972-

73).
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may be empowered to grant licenses and permits to utility
companies which allow the companies to use certain state land,
to have access to certain highways, and to otherwise utilize
public property. Further, some states grant certificates of convenience and necessity which allow utility companies to monopolize the furnishing of services in a geographic area. Finally,
those municipalities which regulate utilities grant franchises
by ordinance or by contract which allow the utilties to operate
a monopoly within the city and to use the public streets and
thoroughfares to that end. Regardless of the type of governmental regulation employed, utility companies operate monopolies under governmental authority, subject to the rules of
various state and local departments and agencies.
The statutes and regulations conferring governmental authority on public utilities also give rise to three additional factors
indicative of state action. First, such legislative and administrative enactments cause the utility companies involved to become
so "entwined ' 3 5 with the governmental powers and policies as
to become a "joint participant 0 or an "agent 3 7 of the state.
In effect, the states, in bestowing upon these utility companies
the powers, privileges, and responsibilities of the government,
make the utilities instrumentalities of the state for the purpose
8
of furnishing services to the public .
35

Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). The
Court reaffirmed this "joint participant" factor several years later
in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1965), holding:
Private persons jointly engaged with state officials in the
prohibited action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of the statute. To act "under color" of law does not
require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is
enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with
the State or its agents.
The Court further elaborated on the necessary extent of the state's
participation in a companion case, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 755-56 (1965), stating:
[T]he involvement of the State need [not] be either exclusive
or direct. In a variety of situations the Court has found state
action of a nature sufficient to create rights under the Equal
Protection Clause even though the participation of the State
was peripheral, or its action was only one of several co-operative forces leading to the constitutional violation.
37 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958).
This agency consideration differs from traditional master-servant law as the Court noted
in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932):
The test is not one whether the . . . [defendants] are the
representatives of the State in the strict sense in which an
agent is the representative of his principal. The test is
whether they are to be classified as representatives of the
36

State to such an extent . . . that the great restraints of the

38

Constitution set limits to their action.
These benefits establish that a private lessee of governmental property
operating a public facility acts as an instrumentality of the state and,
thus, under color of law. Earlier federal cases first articulated these
doctrines. In Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956),
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Second, these same statutes and regulations "foster" and
"encourage" the specific activities of the utility company. In
Moose Lodge the Court noted that the regulations there did
not foster or encourage the racially discriminatory policies of
the private club.3 9 But, specific regulations delineating a private
utility's policies, conduct, and relations with consumers clearly
promote such actions by the government's express sanction of
such activities.
Third, these governmental enactments confer on private
utilities several of the police powers of the state. Specifically,
the government expressly permits private utilities to use public
land and to trespass or enter private land in carrying out their
function of providing services. The exercise of this extraordinary
privilege- the entering of the lands and dwelling of a consumer at will- dramatically portrays the governmental power
possessed by utility companies. Judge Sprecher in his dissent
in Lucas recognized that the utility company's use of this power
clearly constitutes state action. 40 And Judge Young relied on this
41
factor in Palmer.
In summary, these statutes and regulations governing the
utility company's furnishing of services to consumers will turn
42
such resultant conduct into state action.
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957), the court held that a lessee acted
as an agent for the state in operating a restaurant open to the public
located in the city's courthouse and constructed with public funds.
In Department of Conservation & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956), the federal court found state
action in Discriminatory acts by a privately owned bathing facility
which leased shoreline on a seashore owned by the state. Anid
in City of Greensboro v. Simpkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957), the
Fourth Circuit found state action where a lessee of a golf course
owned and constructed by the city discriminated on the basis of race.
In addition, state action has been found where private concerns significantly participated or became involved in state owned property.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restaurant
leased from municipal parking authority and located in authority's
parking garage); Muir v. Louisville Park Theat. (Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971
(1954) (private lessee of city-owned amphitheatre); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (racial zoning laws); Smith v. Holiday Inns of
America, Inc., 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964) (motel on land purchased
from housing authority in redevelopment project promoted with public
funds).
39
40
41
42

407 U.S. at 176-77.
466 F.2d at 664.
342 F. Supp. at 246.
Four Supreme Court cases offer closely analogous fact patterns where
the Court found clear state action. The nature of the state action by
utility companies is not significantly different than the nature of the
state action found to exist in Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135
(1964). In Griffin an arresting officer acting under the "authority of
a deputy sheriff" enforced the private racial segregation policies of a
public amusement park by taking a number of blacks into custody. A
public utility acting under the authority of a state in enforcing its own
policies (i.e., those of a privately owned public service corporation)
parallels the extent of the state action in Griffin.
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B.

Governmental Regulation
In Public Utility Commission v. Pollak,43 the Supreme Court
held a privately owned public utility to be a state actor primarily
because the conduct of this activity had been reviewed and
approved by a governmental administrative body. In Pollak a
private bus company piped radio programs into buses. Several
commuters, complaining of first amendment abridgments, challenged the constitutionality of this conduct. While holding that
no specific constitutional invasion resulted, the Court did conclude that governmental action existed:
We find . . . a sufficiently close relation between the Federal
The nature of public utility state action does not differ from Pennsylvania v. Board of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1956), in
which the Court held that, where a state undertakes an obligation to
enforce a private policy of constitutional deprivations, state action
results (Girard College was maintained as a private segregated boys
school by a board of directors, acting as trustees, as expressly authorized
by an 1869 Pennsylvania statute). Most states undertake an obligation
of expressly approving or reviewing, sub silentio, the policies of utility
companies. Such undertaking may enforce a policy of constitutional
deprivation based upon state action.
The extent of the governmental authority over utilities equals the
state action quotient in Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963). The Supreme Court found requisite state action where police
officers arrested a group of blacks at a luncheon counter in a private
restaurant. A city ordinance forbade desegregation. The Court stated:
When the State has commanded a particular result, it has saved
to itself the power to determine that result and thereby "to a
significant extent" has "become involved" in it, and, in fact, has
removed that decision from the sphere of private choice. It
has thus effectively determined that a person owning, managing, or controlling an eating place is left with no choice of
his own but must segregate his white and Negro patrons. The
Kress management, in deciding to exclude Negroes, did precisely what the city law required.
Id. at 248.
All states have removed from utility companies any decision to deal
or not to deal with certain subscribers by requiring the companies to
deal with all subscribers without discrimination. States have effectively
determined by charter, license, and regulation that utilities will operate
in a certain manner. Thus, utilities have no choice but do precisely
what state or municipal regulations require.
The Court in Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964), found state
action where a state regulation requiring segregated restaurants was
replaced by a regulation merely allowing a manager to remove any
person whom he considered "detrimental" to serve. The regulation
neither ordered segregation nor specifically approved of it. Looking
past the form of the state action, the Court held:
While these Florida regulations do not directly and expressly
forbid restaurants to serve both white and colored people together, they certainly embody a state policy putting burdens
upon any restaurant which serves both races. . . . [W]e conclude that the State through its regulations has become involved to such a significant extent in bringing about restaurant
segregation that appellants' trespass convictions must be held
to reflect that state policy and therefore to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 156-57.
Many states leave certain decisions to utility companies- such decisions as collection practices, repair service, internal company policies,
and others. That very leave granted to utilities by the states significantly involves the state in such actions.
43 343 U.S. 451 (1952).

PUBLIC UTILITIES AND STATE ACTION
Government and the radio service ....

We do .

.

. recognize

that Capital Transit operates its service under the regulatory
supervision of the Public Utilities Commission of the District
of Columbia which is an agency authorized by Congress. We
rely particularly upon the fact that that agency, pursuant to
protests against the radio program, ordered an investigation of
it and, after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation
dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and
44
convenience were not impaired thereby.

The bus company's policies and conduct, expressly reviewed
and sanctioned by a governmental agency, resulted in govern45
mental action.
The regulatory scheme in Pollak exists in nearly all states.
Public utility commissions have the power to review, approve,
modify, or impose regulations and rules of conduct on utility
companies, and in particular on conduct involving relations with
consumers. The court in Ihrke noted that the regulatory body
had the power to approve and revise Northern's regulations
regarding collection practices. 46 In Palmer the court noted that
the public utility commission, upon a complaint by a person,
must hold a hearing and determine whether the challenged
practice of the utility company is unreasonable. 47 In Lucas,
the dissent noted that the Wisconsin Public Service Commission
had held hearings in 1932 and had investigated collection practices. 48 These hearings, never referred to in the majority opinion,
resulted in the issuance of rules and in the express approval of
the very termination practices challenged in Lucas. The majority holding in Lucas, then, stands in direct conflict with the
Supreme Court's decision in Pollak.
In addition, the actions taken by governmental regulatory
commissions in reviewing and approving utilities' conduct
and policies fall within the affirmative support factor sug44 Id. at 462 (footnotes of the Court omitted).

See Bright v. Isenbarger, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971), where the court
found no state action because of insufficient state involvement with
the operations of a private school. But the presence of a state statute
requiring private schools to perform a certain act may lead to conduct
stemming from that performance being deemed state action. Coleman
v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970). Bright, and other
school cases, have been used by courts to avoid finding state action in
several similar fact situations, including public utility cases. E.g., the
majority opinion in Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638,
657 n.47 (7th Cir. 1972). But these cases have little precedential value
to utility cases because: (1) the facts differ significantly, (2) private
schools do not have a monopoly on education, and (3) the state has not
reserved the power to control, approve, review, or modify school rules
dealing with expulsion or disciplinary problems, or for that matter,
many other problems.
46 459 F.2d at 570.
47 342 F. Supp. at 245.
48 466 F. 2d at 667.
45
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gested by Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Moose Lodge.4 .
While a utility company may prepare and file its own regulations with a utility commission, the commission's acceptance,
review, or approval of those rules constitutes ratification and
governmental sanction of conduct performed pursuant to those
rules. Such affirmative support, under Justice Rehnquist's
analysis, clearly renders such conduct state action.
This general regulatory scheme, held sufficient in the above
cases to evidence state action, equally applies to every privately owned public utility company in the United States
not only because each of these utilities operates under the
regulation of an administrative agency, commonly a public utility commission,5" but also because several other governmental
entities, such as state legislatures, local governmental units,
and the federal government, subject these utilities to regulation.
The following paragraphs discuss local and federal government
regulation of these types of utilities after briefly tracing the
development of state regulation into the present-day public
utility commissions with their resultant powers and jurisdictions. The discussion shows that the nature and extent of these
regulations clearly subject privately owned public utility companies to the concept of state action.
Public control of utilities has focused principally upon
state regulation by state legislatures. In the early part of this
century, state legislatures enacted specific statutes which directly regulated the operations of utilities. 51 Such regulation
was necessary because of the unsavory conditions that developed
in utility organization and management during the latter part
of the 19th century. The states regarded the utility services
furnished as basic to the health, safety, and welfare of the
public and recognized a sovereign right to legislate with respect
49 See 407 U.S. at 175-77; Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d

638, 656 (7th Cir. 1972).

50 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 49 (Page 1954), as amended, (Supp.

1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 196 (West 1957), as amended, (Supp. 197273). Forty-six states have public service commissions with statewide
jurisdictions over privately owned gas and electrical utilities. Those
states that have other forms of regulatory control include: (1) Minnesota has delegated regulatory control over utilities to municipalities
and other governmental units. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 412.331 to .391,
451.07, 454.041 to .042 (West 1958), as amended, (Supp. 1972-73);
(2) In Nebraska, all electric utilities are owned by local governmental
subdivisions; (3) South Dakota has authorized local towns and cities to
regulate utility companies; (4) And in Texas, a state regulatory commission has jurisdiction only over wholesale rates charged by privately
owned public utilities. SUBCOMIrrEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

OF THE COMMITrEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS,

COMMISSIONS,
51 J. BAUER & P.

STATE UTILITY

S. Doc. No. 56, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
COSTELLO, PUBLIC ORGANIZATION OF ELECTRIC POWER
BAUER & COSTELLO].

(1949) [hereinafter cited as
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to this public interest. Initial regulations attempted to place
controls on the financial manipulation, franchise consolidation,
52
excessive rates, and other abuses prevalent in the industry.
With the birth of administrative agencies and the growing
complexity of utility regulation, state legislatures enacted general legislation creating public utility commissions with the
power to promulgate detailed rules. 53 Forty-six states have
4
public utility commissions regulating privately owned utilities.
Not all such commissions have the same powers or the same
scope of jurisdiction. A commission, depending on the state, may
have control over numerous utilities including electricity, gas,
water, steam, telephone, telegraph, bus, rapid transit, motor
carriers, pipelines, and railroad companies. 55 In addition, such
commissions, again depending on the state, may have jurisdiction
over many facets of the utilities' operations including: (1)
certificates of convenience, (2) leasing rights, (3) mergers and
consolidations, (4) reorganizations, (5) securities, (6) dividends,
(7) budgets and expenditures, (8) loans, (9) major property
additions, (10) customer relations, (11) service, (12) construction, and (13) reasonable and just rates enabling the utility to
50
Furearn a fair return on the fair value of property used.
ther, such commissions through formalized procedures review
the books and records of utility companies, investigate consumer complaints, grant informal and formal hearings, and
make determinations, particularly on rates, which closely affect
57
the practices of utility companies.
In addition to the administrative regulatory scheme on the
state level, several states presently allow local governmental
units to regulate privately owned public utilities. Municipalities
within these states have the right, expressed in or implied from
state constitutions and statutes, to grant franchises giving utilities the right to use the public streets and to attach to these
58
franchises conditions regarding rates, services, and operations.
In some states, such municipal regulation takes the place of
any state regulation; in other states, both the state and municipalities regulate specific operations of utility companies. Municipalities involved in a local regulatory scheme have in turn
52

Id.

53THE

TWENTIETH

CENTURY

FUND,

ELECTRIC

POWER

AND

GOVERNMENT

POLICY 52 (1948) [hereinafter cited as TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND].
54 L. METCALF & V. REINEMER, OVERCHARGE 28 ('1967).
55 E. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILrrIES 407 (1950).
56 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND at 53-54, 254.
57 Id. at 65-66.
58 BAUER & COSTELLO at 34-35; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND at 106-11.
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established administrative commissions at the local level which
operate in a fashion similar to state public utility commissions.
In addition, many municipalities own and operate utility companies which furnish services, particularly water, to residents
of the municipalityFinally, the federal government controls various interstate
practices of utility companies. The Federal Water Power Act
of 1920 provides the federal government with jurisdiction over
all power sites in navigable streams of the United States and
otherwise authorizes the Federal Power Commission to develop and control water as a utility.59 The Federal Power Act
of 1935 provides the Federal Power Commission with jurisdiction over the transmission of electrical energy at wholesale
prices in interstate commerce.6 ° Similarly, the Natural Gas Act
of 1938 provides the Commission with jurisdiction over the
interstate transportation and sale of wholesale natural gas."1
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 delegates to
the Securities .and Exchange Commission powers over the public organization of utility companies which include registration,
sale and purchase of securities and assets, restriction of intercompany loans, restriction of dividend payments, and prescription of accounting and record procedures. 62 The Federal Power
Commission's jurisdiction over electric and gas utilities includes
ratemaking functions and activities, control over accounting and
financial matters, control over the purchase and sale of properties, responsibility for the publication of reports concerning
the power resources and needs of the country, responsibility
for studying costs of plant construction and plant operation,
and responsibility for distributing information to state and
63
municipal utility commissions.
In summary, at least some aspects of the state, local, or
federal regulations apply to every privately owned public utility, and it is these regulations which subject the utilities to
state action concepts.
C. Governmental Function
The Supreme Court has held that a private organization
which assumes operating, managing, or supplying a governmental function takes such action under color of law. In Terry
v. Abrams,64 the Court concluded that the delegation by the
59 16 U.S.C. §§ 791 to 825r (1970).
60 Id. § 824.
61 15 U.S.C. §§ 171 to 171w (1970).
62 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z (1970).
63
BAUER & COSTELLO at 45-47; TWENTIETH
64345 U.S. 461 (1953).

CENTURY FUND

at 67, 73-76.

1973

PUBLIC UTILITIES AND STATE ACTION

state of governmental powers (control of the electoral process
for public officials) is the delegation of a state function and as
such renders the private party's actions state action. Subsequently, the Court explicitly held in Evans v. Newton:
When private individuals or groups are endowed by the State
with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to
its constitutional limitations. 65

And in the earlier case of Marsh v. Alabama,66 the Court had
established this doctrine by finding state action where the state
merely permitted a private corporation to undertake the governmental function of operating a town and furnishing municipal
services. The Court held that the town fulfilled governmental
functions and therefore lost its identification as purely private
property even though it was privately owned and controlled.
Several federal courts have also found state action in the
nature of the function undertaken by private corporations. 6 7 In
65 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). In Evans, the City of Macon, Georgia operated
a public park on a segregated basis pursuant to the terms of a will bequeathing the park to a trust. Subsequently, to continue these segregationist policies, the public trustees resigned and private trustees took
over control of the park. The Supreme Court found that the private
trustees' operation of the park still resulted in state action despite
the fact that formal control had passed from the City's hands. The
public function of the park and the past relationship of the City with
the park rendered the acts of the private trustees state acts. The Court
stated:
Mass recreation through the use of parks is plainly in the public
domain....
[W]e cannot but conclude that the public character of this park
requires that it be treated as a public institution subject to the
command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who
now has title under state law. Id. at 303.
The Court here found the operation of a city park to be a governmental
function though the facilities of the park itself were not publicly
owned, and did not provide necessities of life to the public as utility
services do.
The Court first extended the reach of Marsh to
66 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
cover a denial of first amendment rights in a shopping center parking
lot by analogizing the public character of such a lot to the municipal
area in Marsh. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968). But recently the Court retreated from the
apparent positions established in Marsh and Logan Valley by limiting
the free speech rights of demonstrators in a private shopping center
to dissemination of material directly connected with the operation of the
center itself or with one of the businesses in the center (and not to
anti-war literature). Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
67 Several other courts have found state action in two related public function areas. In United States v. Barr, 295 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
and in United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), the courts found that private process servers who falsified affidavits of service (popularly called "sewer service") engaged in an inherently governmental function and acted with government authority
pursuant to the state statute permitting them to act as substitute process
servers. And in Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970), the court
found state action where a private landlord seized a tenant's personal
property pursuant to a state statute authorizing such enforcement of
landlords' liens because such entry and summary seizure was inherently
and historically a state function.
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Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co.,68 the city granted a bus
franchise to a private bus concern. In declaring the existence of
state action, the court stated:
The issuing of such a franchise by the City of Birmingham is a governmental function, controlled and authorized by
the constitution of Alabama ...
It is, of course, fundamental that the justification for the
grant by a state to a private corporation of a right or franchise to perform such a public utility service as furnishing
transportation, gas, electricity, or the like, on the public
streets of the city, is that the grantee is about the public's
business. It is doing something the state deems useful for the
public necessity or convenience. This is what differentiates
the public utility which holds what may be called a "special
franchise," from an ordinary business corporation which in
common with all others is granted the privilege of operating
in corporate form but does not have that special franchise of
using state property for private gain to perform a public
6
function. 9.

In Farmer v. Moses, the court found the privately owned promoter of the New York World's Fair to be a state actor declaring: "[T]he New York World's Fair, although operated by a
private corporation, is a matter of public concern, for the pub' 70
lic good and for the general welfare of the state.
Judge Theis in Stanford found the Gas Service Company
supplying an "essential commodity to the citizens" and "beyond
question" performing "public functions."71 The dissent in Lucas,
after tracing the development of public utility law from English history, concluded that utility companies clearly perform
state-delegated functions. 72 And the Eighth Circuit in Ihrke
declared the issues before the court were not moot because
such issues presented "recurring questions of public interest."
The court's recognition of the public interest inherent in such
cases offers further proof of the vital function such services
73
provide.
68 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
610Id. at 434-35. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the Boman proposition in two
subsequent cases. In Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir.
1961), the court stated: "When in the execution of that public function
it is the instrument by which state policy is to be, and is, effectuated,
activity which might otherwise be deemed private may become state
action .... ." And in Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320,
322-23 (5th Cir. 1962), the court again stated: ."We noted that when a
state authorizes a city to grant a franchise for public transportation to
a local bus or street car company, such transportation service is performed by the franchise holder as a service performed for the benefit
of the people of the state. The private company is, to that extent, exercising a part of sovereignty in that it is performing a state function."
70 232 F. Supp. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
71 Stanford v. Gas Service Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D. Kan. 1972).
72 466 F.2d at 665.
73 459 F.2d at 571.
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The following discussion demonstrates that public utility
companies perform a governmental function because government delegates and regulates utility services; the furnishing
of such services requires the exercise of governmental powers;
and utility services, such as electricity, gas, and water, are
74
necessities of life.
Utility services have historically been considered to be
public and governmental functions. In medieval England, private guilds operated public services. The rules and operating
regulations of these guilds were declared void by local courts
if such were inconsistent with the public use. The feudal regime in England gradually replaced these guilds, and manorlords granted the first franchises to private individuals to supply public services. The royal courts of England overviewed
innkeepers and ferrymen because of the nature of their service
to the public. 75 Against this backdrop, public service law began
to evolve. Parliament in England began to regulate the rates of
public service corporations which were granted monopolies in
certain services. In addition, the English lawmakers and courts
imposed certain duties and obligations on public service organizations: "The characteristic thing as now was the legal
imposition of an affirmative duty of proper actions upon those
7' 6
who openly professed a public employment.
During the development of this country, colonial governments similarly granted franchises and regulated rates and
operations of those performing a public function. Early courts
recognized this function as governmental in nature:
Men set up systems of government in order to subserve certain public ends, and reach advantages that could not otherwise be made available. The state is clothed with the trust
of answering these ends. It is not to be limited to the mere
duty of governing the people by the exercise of its police
power, but it has a higher duty,-to promote the educational
interests of the people, encourage their industrial pursuits,
develop its material resources, and foster its commercial interests, by providing all reasonable facilities demanded by a
prudent regard for the growth, development, and general
prosperity of a free people .... 77

In furtherance of these ends of government, states enacted
statutes delegating to public service corporations the privilege
74

B.

WYMAN,

PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS

4

(1911).

Id.
76 Id. at 5.

75

77

City of Minneapolis v. Janney, 86 Minn. 111, 116, 90 N.W. 312, 315
(1902) (court's citations omitted).
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of furnishing utility services to the public. 78 In addition to such
delegation, the states retained control over these companies
through regulatory commissions and reserved the power to review, approve, or modify the policies and operations of such
utilities.79 Today, utility companies perform a governmental
function because they must exercise governmental powers, delegated by the state, to provide their services. The governmental
authority section of this article discussed at length the governmental powers bestowed upon utility companies by the state,
such as the power of eminent domain, police powers, and the
privilege of using public property. The very delegation of such
powers can only be made to a public and not a private concern.
"No business can be granted a privilege under our constitutional system unless public in character."8 0 Utility companies
have long been considered to be public and governmental in
nature. Electric lighting is an example:
Electric lighting is universally recognized as a public enterprise, in aid of which the right of eminent domain may be
invoked. Corporations organized for the purpose of furnishing
electric light to the public are quasi public corporations, and,
under government control, must serve the public on terms and
conditions common to all without discrimination. The same
rule has been applied to corporations organized to supply the
inhabitants of cities with natural gas for heating and lighting
purposes. .

.

. The control of the state over the manner in

which such companies shall deal with the public is implied.
The generation of electrical power for distribution and
sale to the general public on equal terms is a public enterprise, and property so used is devoted to a public use.8 1

Furthermore, the fact that the company may be privately owned
does not remove it from the sphere of government control,
governmental function, and public use. The United States Supreme Court established this proposition in Olcott v. The Supervisors:
Whether the use of the railroad is a public or private one
depends no measure upon the question who constructed it or
who owns it. It has never been considered a matter of any
importance that the road was built by the agency of a private
corporation. No matter who is the agent, the function performed is that of the
State. Though the ownership is private
82
the use is public.
78 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 196.49 to .50 (West 1957); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 300.03 (West 1969).
79 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 49 (Page 1954), as amended, (Supp.
1971); WIs. STAT. ANN. ch. 195 (West 1957), as amended, (Supp. 197273).
80 B. WYMAN, supra note 74, at 42.
81 Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Koochiching Co., 97 Minn. 429, 450-51,
107 N.W. 405, 413-14 (1906) (court's citations omitted).
82 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678, 695 (1872).
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Utility companies can also be said to perform a governmental function because utility services, such as electricity,
gas, and water, are necessities of life. The court in Palmer
recognized this:
The lack of heat in the winter time has very serious effects
upon the physical health of human beings, and can easily be
fatal. A sudden withdrawal of heating fuel can also result in
severe damage to property, both real and personal. . .. [A]
much more
person can freeze to death or die of 8pneumonia
3
quickly than he can starve to death.
And the court in Stanford concluded: "It is not open to question
that food, clothing, and shelter are considered necessary to
sustain life. . . . [U]nheated shelter affects life itself.
Nothing is more basic to the American system of values, indeed
'8 4
Utility
mankind, than the continued existence of life itself.
services furnish consumers with heat, warm meals, refrigerated
food, hot water, lights, gas supplies, electric current, and a
habitable and decent home. Without such life generating and
life sustaining services, urban man could not exist.
Additionally, if privately owned utility companies did not
furnish these vital services, the government would have to
furnish them. In fact, statutes in all states permit municipalities
or other governmental subdivisions to own and operate a utility
company.85 In one state, the government owns and operates
all electric utility services.86 In other states, some governmentally owned utility departments furnish utility services to

designated geographic areas. However, outside of those limited
areas, privately owned public utilities assume the governmental
role and provide services.
Thus, in all states, the government has allowed privately
8 7
owned utility companies to perform governmental functions.
83
84

342 F. Supp. at 244.

346 F. Supp. at 719-20, 721.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 300.05 (West 1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
196.57 (West 1957).
86 Nebraska. See NEB. REv. STAT. ch. 18, art. 4 (1970).
87 These governmental functions may be services of a "public character,"
"inherently governmental" actions, or acts exercised as part of the "sovereign power" of the state. See respectively, the cases cited in notes

85 See, e.g.,

65, 67, and 69 supra.
Certain functions may be more related to governmental responsibilities
than others, but nevertheless, a private party who assumes the operation of a public or governmental function, whether such function
stems from an inherent power of the state, from its sovereignty, or
from past historical connections, performs as a state actor in satisfying
a public need or interest. In Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149
F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), the Court found that the private trustees
of a library acted under the color of law because the city financed the
library's budget and because the maintenance of the library, though
not an essential function, was a proper and usual function of the state.
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This creation goes far beyond the granting of a corporate charter. Through the delegation of police powers, the granting of
the privilege of eminent domain, and the continual regulation
and approval of utilities' operations, the states have created
the utility companies as instrumentalities to carry on the
utility functions of the government. For these privileges and
for performing a governmental service, utilities in turn become
subject to constitutional restraints through state action principles.
Direct Financial Benefit to the Government
The government financially benefits from the operations of
public utilities. In addition to levying normal taxes, statutes
in many states require each utility company to pay for the privilege of obtaining a monopoly and for the extensive use of
8
These statutes require each utility to pay
public property.1
the state a certain percentage of its gross revenue earnings.
Through such payments, governments receive many millions of
dollars which ostensibly reimburse the state for the costs of
the regulatory commission, its staff, its investigations, and its
hearings. However, regulatory commissions rarely cost that much
to operate. Thus, many states gain additional monies which are
used as general revenue funds to defray other costs of government and to help balance the state budget.
This economic relationship between a state and a public
utility has great significance for purposes of state action. The
9
Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority
stated that the financial connections between a governmental
agency and a private company are further indicia to state action.
D.

[S]tate responsibility [has been] interpreted as necessarily
following upon "state participation" through arrangement,
management, funds, or property....
[T]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence .

.

. that it must be recognized as a joint

participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account,
cannot be considered to have been so "purely private" as to
9o
fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Burton, the government owned parking authority relied, in
part, on the lease income from a privately owned coffee shop.
This financial arrangement benefited the parking authority and
consequently further involved the state with private actions.
88 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 7a.5 (Smith-Hurd 1966); St. Paul, Minn.,
Ordinances 11761, 11762, Jan. 1972. But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 115-2-14 (1963); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 196.85 (1957).

89 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
90 Id. at 722, 725.
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The Eighth Circuit in the Ihrke decision more directly relied
on the financial relationship between the City of St. Paul and
the Northern States Power Company. Under the municipal
franchise, Northern was obligated to pay to the city 5 percent
of the gross earnings it received in St. Paul.9' This amounted
to several millions of dollars, but more importantly, constituted
over 5 percent of total revenues raised for the city's budget.
The city used the money collected to offset municipal expenses
in lieu of raising revenue by way of additional taxes on the
public. Northern thus contributed huge sums of money essential to the economic functioning of the city. The Eighth Circuit
recognized this factor:
It is thus apparent that 5% of every dollar collected by
Northern for gas and electricity sold in St. Paul is paid to the
city. While the city does not participate in Northern's collection procedures, it does reserve the right to approve or even
revise Northern's regulations relating 92thereto, and it is obviously the direct beneficiary of them.

Thus, because of the gross earnings fee payment, the city's
financial benefit from Northern's operations in St. Paul further
entwined the city with Northern's activities. Similar beneficial
economic ties between the government and public utilities provide additional links between state action and allegedly private
93
conduct.
E. Monopolistic Status
Many entities act under governmental authority and find
some of their conduct regulated by public agencies. Other companies perform public functions and pay fees to the government
for such privilege. What, then, conclusively brands utilities as
state actors? Their monopolistic status in providing necessities
91 This is an obligation imposed by the city and is not in lieu of any sales
or use tax imposed on businesses other than utilities.
92 459 F.2d at 570.
93 Federal courts have relied on financing arrangements to declare conduct
taken by schools state action. In Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 239 F.
Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965), a group of blacks challenged Virginia's practice of awarding tuition grants to parents for reimbursement of their
children's education in private schools. Though the schools were neither
controlled by nor connected with the state, the court declared the practice unconstitutional because the state aid was the dominant method
of financing segregated schools. And, in Doe v. Hackler, 316 F. Supp.
1144 (D.N.H. 1970), the court found state conduct in the actions of a
private school which contracted with the governing bodies of five townships to educate high school aged children in exchange for tuition payments. The court declared that because of such financing the school
acted as a governmental actor. The Doe case did not involve racial
discrimination, but rather a student's right to wear long hair. And even
where a state makes little or no financial contribution to an institution,
the existence of official control by state officials will cause private
school conduct to become state action. See Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270
F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), alf'd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 921 (1968).
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of life. The operation of a monopoly by a utility will, even in
"close" cases, render those operations governmental or state
action. Monopolies have always been abhorred by our system
of government. 94 Yet, most utilities operate as monopolies which
do business only with the express permission of the government
which continually regulates their practices. Governments license
and franchise these monopolies as a substitute for direct governmental provision of the particular necessities. To assure
these necessities, states have often permitted private utilities
to monopolize a certain geographic area and have guaranteed
such companies a "fair" rate of return in consideration.
Often, gas, electric, and water utilities operate natural
monopolies. The scarcity of the natural resources, the limitations placed on discovering, producing, and distributing such
services, and the large capital expenditures necessary to operate a utility result in the creation of this natural monopoly.
Sometimes utilities gain a virtual monopoly in an area simply
by being there first, by having the use of all the necessary
public property, and by having invested huge sums of money
in such things as poles, wires, conduits, and other utility
apparatus. In addition, states have conferred a statutory monopoly upon utility companies. Upon accepting a franchise from
the government, the utility also gains complete freedom from
competition in a geographic area for a period of years.95 Such
statutes and franchises prohibit any other utility from supplying
services to consumers in that area.
Such monopolistic statutes may impose tremendous hardships on consumers. Unlike any other choice for the purchase
of necessities, such as food, clothing, and shelter, a consumer
has no choice but to apply for and accept service from one
utility company. States guarantee captive customers for the
utility company. Hardships result particularly where the consumer disagrees or disputes billing practices, collection procedures, deposit requirements, or otherwise has poor relations
with the utility.96 Though validly disgruntled, the consumer has
nowhere else to turn for such services.
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95 See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 196.495 (West Supp. 1972), amending WIs.
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96 In Jackson v. Northern States Power Co., 343 F. Supp. 265 (D. Minn.
1972), the federal district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the utility company from continuing to terminate service to
five named indigent plaintiffs. The utility had terminated service to
two subscribers who had disputed the amount of their bill; one of these
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Courts have recognized the monopolistic characteristic of
utility companies as an important element of state action. In
Ihrke,97 and in both the Palmer8 and Stanford9 decisions, the
courts looked to the utility companies' monopolistic positions as
a controlling state action factor. And the Lucas dissent, after
reviewing the history of public utility law, concluded that the
monopolistic characteristic isolates utility companies from all
other types of private businesses and results in state action. 10 0
Furthermore, in Moose Lodge, both the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Supreme Court stated that monopolistic
status is a factor to be considered in finding state action 10 1
In addition, privately owned public utilities themselves
have declared, at least for purposes of antitrust laws, that
their conduct constitutes state action. This position has been
adopted by the courts in deciding that antitrust laws do
not apply to public utilities. 1" 2 The Fifth Circuit in Gas Light
Co. v. Georgia Power Co. held that the practices of electric
parties (a family with six children) went without electricity for six
weeks because they were not able to pay the alleged bill. The company also terminated service to two tenants who did not owe anything,
but whose landlord failed to pay past accrued bills amounting to over
$400. And the utility threatened to terminate service to the fifth plaintiff, an epileptic woman, who was deaf in one ear, 90 percent blind, a
mother of two children, pregnant with her third child, and recently
deserted by her husband, for a]leged nonpayment of a $54 back bill. In
the Ihrke case, the Thrkes faced termination for their failure to pay
a $24 back bill and a $100 security deposit without being afforded an
opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the deposit. In Palmer,
the utility company's particularly arbitrary and grievous collection practices prompted the court to conclude: "The evidence as a whole revealed a rather shockingly callous and impersonal attitude upon the
arct of the defendant, which relied uncritically upon its computer,
ocated in a distant city, and the far from infallible clerks who served
it, and paid no attention to the notorious uncertainities of the postal
service." 342 F. Suipp. at 243.
In large metropolitan areas, many consumers find themselves at the
mercy of utility collection agents who have the power to affect their
lives like no other creditor has, save, perhaps, the Internal Revenue
Service. For a further survey of the hardships inflicted on utility consumers, particularly the poor, see Note, The Shutoff of Utility Services
for Nonpayment: A Plight of the Poor, 46 WASH. L. REV. 745 (1971);
Note, Public Utilities and the Poor: The Requirement of Cash Deposits
from Domestic Customers, 78 YALE L.J. 448 (1969).
97 459 F.2d at 570. The Ihrke court relied on a recent First Circuit decision
involving state action and a private monopolistic situation. In Lavoie v.
Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (lst Cir. 1972), the court found a trailer park sufficiently immeshed in state activity because of a city ordinance granting
that park a monopoly over trailer sites within the city.
98 342 F. Supp. at 245.
99 346 F. Supp. at 722.
100 466 F.2d at 663-65.
101 407 U.S. at 177, 182.
0
1

2 In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Supreme Court held that

the Sherman Act did not cover actions by governmental instrumentalities, but only individual private actions. Thus, any company that
can show that its conduct constitutes state action remains immune from
antitrust laws.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 49

companies, which were alleged to be conspiracies to eliminate
natural gas as a competitive source with electricity, were immune from antitrust attack. 0 3 Electric companies successfully
argued this immunity and stated that though they were monopolies, their actions were "state actions" and thus properly
anticompetitive. The Fifth Circuit concluded:
Defendants' [electric utilities'] conduct cannot be characterized
as individual action when we consider the state's intimate involvement .... Though the rates and practices originated with
the regulated utility, Georgia Power, the facts make it plain
from the Commission as products of the
that they emerged
104
Commission.
And the Fourth Circuit, in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co., declared that the offering of free underground electric service lines to new home builders in return for
all electric installations did not violate antitrust "tie-in" prohibitions because such conduct by the utility companies constituted
state action. 10 5 Accordingly, privately owned utility companies
should not be allowed to be constitutional chameleons. The Fourth
and Fifth Circuits' findings of state action in these cases should
mirror a finding of state action in other cases which deal with
privately owned public utilities.
In summary, privately owned public utilities operate monopolistic enterprises. The monopolies have sometimes arisen as
natural monopolies and sometimes as statutory monopolies. In
either instance, the government has become thoroughly entangled with the utilities in providing consumers with necessities of life. The logical conclusion that utility action is state
action is virtually inevitable. The utility companies themselves
have successfully used this argument - to promote their own
self-interest. Accordingly, a utility with a monopolistic status
must consistently be considered a state actor.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that under any one of five concepts the conduct of privately owned public utilities constitutes
state action. Specifically, such utilities act under governmental
authority and statutes, find themselves extensively regulated by
administrative agencies of the government, perform necessary
governmental or public functions, provide direct financial benefits to the government, and operate monopolies replete with
captive customers and guaranteed profits. These factors con103 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
104

Id. at 1140.

105 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
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clusively show public utilities to be state actors. In turn, this
showing more realistically renders privately owned public utilities subject to ultimate regulation through judicial action.106
Now, subscribers who have been left out of the political
process and who find no viable representation on public utility
commissions will have a forum in which to voice their grievances. Perhaps subscribers will force such agencies to be more
responsive to issues posed by modern urban life. Perhaps even
the utility companies themselves will now be motivated to
fulfill their obligations and responsibilities to the consuming
public.
Several courts have held residential utility services to be
"entitlements" afforded constitutional protections.10 7 Without
question, utility services such as gas, electricity, and water are
necessities of life. Without such life generating and life sustaining "commodities" urban consumers could not maintain their
life, liberty, or property.'}' 8 Consumers will be able to protect
such vital necessities by challenging, before impartial courts,
the practices and policies of utility companies. Among the targets of such challenges are the allegedly private business decisions of utility companies, the propriety and need for rate increases to maintain high profits and salaries, 10 the unilateral
imposition of deposit requirements not actually related to credit
ratings," 0 the self-serving collection practices of terminating
services without affording the consumer timely notice or an
opportunity to be heard,"' a host of latent environmental is106 Not all activities of a public utility will be brought under constitutional

scrutiny. In Martin v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971), the court there found no
state action in a, challenge to a utility company's internal management
operations. But, clearly, a utility's dealings with consumers involves
activities always subject to review or approval by a regulatory commission if, in fact, not already sanctioned by that body.
107 Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Davis v. Weir,
328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
lo0 The Supreme Court has declared many similar rights, privileges, entitlements, and interests protected by constitutional due process and
equal protection: welfare assistance (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970)), wages (Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)),
reputation (Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)), driving
licenses (Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)), access to courts (Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)), and the continued possession and
use of personal property (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)).
109 See consumer interventions in rate hearings cited in note 2 supra.
110 See Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia Pub. Serv. Co.,
5 CLEUARNGHOUSE REV. 770 (Apr. 1972); Parsons v. Central Ill. Pub.
Serv. Co., 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 333 (Oct. 1971); Hall v. Central Ill.
Pub. Serv. Co., 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 333 (Oct. 1971).
111 Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972); Davis
v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Palmer v. Columbia Gas
Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Jackson v. Northern States
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sues, and a broad spectrum of arbitrary and capricious actions
taken by utility companies.
Our constitutional system provides no haven for the exercise
of arbitrary power by the government or its agents. Privately
owned public utilities exert a great deal of influence on the
day-to-day living conditions of this nation's citizens. Although
the government has previously failed to effectively control the
utilities' enormous power, perhaps consumers can now significantly augment that control through private causes of action
in the courts. These consumers ask only that the courts declare
what should have been obvious all along-since utilities perform such conclusively public functions, they must be held to
state action standards and safeguard individual rights accordingly.
POSTSCRIPT
Subsequent to the completion of this article, two federal
district courts rendered decisions on the public utility-state
action issue. In Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., Judge
Tyler found state action declaring:
In the relevant legal sense, Con Ed is by no stretch of the imagination a purely private enterprise. The State of New York,
by extensive statutory and regulatory scheme, has circumscribed almost every aspect of the utility's activities, and has,
by the same means, granted it powers not available to a typical
1 12
private concern.

And in Hattell v. Public Service Co.,"13 Judge Winner followed
the lead of Ihrke and Stanford and held this public utility subject to state action concepts. In both cases, the courts sustained the claims of the plaintiff consumers seeking relief from
certain collection and termination practices by the respective
utility companies.
In addition, another recent federal court decision, Lamb v.
Hamblin,114 found unequivocally that utility consumers have a
constitutional right to be afforded notice and an impartial
hearing prior to the termination of utility services. This decision represents one of the first cases which ensures the due
process rights of consumers by ordering a utility (a municipal
water department) to establish a hearing procedure.
Power Co., 343 F. Supp. 265 (D. Minn. 1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co.,
346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Andress v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., No. 3-72-185 (D. Minn. June 27, 1972); Lamb v. Hamblin, No. 3-72115 (D. Minn. Nov. 30, 1972).
112 Civil No. 72-3037 at 7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1972).
113 No. C-4206 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 1972).
114 No. 3-72-115 (D. Minn. Nov. 30, 1972).

